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Abstract. A set of sentential revision operations can be generated in a select-direct way
within a new framework for belief change named descriptor revision ﬁrstly introduced in
Hansson [8]. In this paper, we adopt another constructive approach to these operations,
based on a relation  on sentences named believability relation. Intuitively, ϕ  ψ means
that the subject is at least as prone to believe or accept ϕ as to believe or accept ψ.
We demonstrate that so called H-believability relations and basic believability relations,
the second of which the is axiomatically characterized with a set of weak postulates, are
faithful alternative models for two typical select-direct sentential revision operations. Then
we investigate additional postulates on believability relations that correlate with proper-
ties of the generated revision operations. Finally, we show that traditional AGM revision
operations can be reconstructed from a strengthened variant of the basic believability
relation and there is a close connection between this relation and the standard epistemic
entrenchment relation.
Keywords: Sentential revision, Belief change, Select-direct, Descriptor revision, Believ-
ability relation, AGM revision, Epistemic entrenchment relation.
1. Introduction
In Hansson [8] it is argued that in the classical literatures (such as
Alchourro´n et al. [1] and Grove [6]) on logic of belief change which mainly
focus the operations of contraction and revision, we can ﬁnd a standard
methodology which can be summarized as “select-and-intersect”: Select the
most plausible sets that satisfy the success condition (for example, removing
a speciﬁed sentence from original beliefs in the case of contraction, or adding
a speciﬁed sentence to original beliefs in the case of revision or expansion),
and then take their intersection as outcome. Hansson [7,8] further argued
that this method has at least three major disadvantages. Firstly, the prop-
erty of being an optimal potential outcome is not generally preserved under
intersection. This point can be illustrated by an example in Sandqvist [15].
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Secondly, the fact that a success condition holds for all elements of a family
of sets does not always imply that their intersection also satisﬁes this condi-
tion. For an instance, the success condition of “making up one’s mind” about
ϕ, i.e. adding ϕ or adding ¬ϕ to original beliefs, is not generally preserved to
be satisﬁed after intersection. Thirdly, the adequacy of the options available
for selection and intersection is contestable. In the traditional framework,
the selection is made among remainders (Alchourro´n et al. [1]) or possi-
ble worlds (Grove [6]). It is not diﬃcult to show that neither of them are
plausible belief sets (Alchourro´n & Makinson [2], Hansson [7]).
In order to avoid these disadvantages, a new approach to belief change
named “descriptor revision” was introduced in a series of papers by Hansson
[7–10]. In contrast to “select-and-intersect” among the implausible options,
the methodology of this approach can be summarized as “select-direct”
among the plausible options: It is assumed that there is a set of belief sets
(not necessarily being remainders or possible worlds) as potential outcomes
of belief change, and the mechanism of change is a direct choice among these
potential outcomes. On the other hand, this is a very general framework since
success conditions for various types of belief changes are described in a gen-
eral way with the help of a metalinguistic belief operator B. For example,
the success condition of contraction by ϕ is ¬Bϕ, that of revision by ϕ is
Bϕ, that of making up one’s mind about ϕ is Bϕ ∨ B¬ϕ. A descriptor is a
set of such formulas with B that encode the relevant success condition and
descriptor revision on belief set K is performed with a uniﬁed operator ◦
which applies to all descriptors (Hansson [8]).
This new construction for belief change cannot only be used to investigate
some interesting belief change patterns which cannot be represented in the
“select-and-intersect” way, such as making up one’s mind (Zhang & Hansson
[16]), but also throw new light on the traditional operations. For example,
sentential revision  can be reconstructed in a select-direct way from descrip-
tor revision as K ϕ = K ◦Bϕ. Another interesting consequence of this new
proposal is that an alternative construction with a relation ∗ of epistemic
proximity deﬁned on descriptors was proved being an alternative modelling
for the descriptor revision (Hansson [9]). Let Ψ and Φ be any two descriptors.
Informally, Ψ∗ Ξ means that “the subject is at least disposed to perform a
change in the belief system resulting in assent to Ψ as one resulting in assent
to Ξ” (Hansson [9]). Just as a sentential revision  can be derived from a
descriptor revision ◦, it seems a relation  on sentences can also be derived
from a proximity relation ∗ . This kind of relation  is named as believability
relation (Hansson [9]) since the intended interpretation of ϕ  ψ is as same
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as that of Bϕ∗ Bψ.1 Intuitively, ϕ  ψ means that the subject is at least
as prone to believing or accepting ϕ as incorporating ψ into her beliefs.
As it was shown that descriptor revision can be reconstructed from the
relations of epistemic proximity (Hansson [9]), the question naturally arises
whether the believability relation derived from the relations of epistemic
proximity can be used as an alternative modelling for the sentential revision
derived from descriptor revision. The main purpose of the present contribu-
tion is to show that some revision operations generated in this way indeed
can be reconstructed by believability relations satisfying some suitable con-
ditions too. It should be noted that the idea of using relations on sentences
reﬂecting degree of acceptance to construct revision operations also appeared
in models in Cantwell [3] and Rott [4]. However, in both of them the rela-
tions reﬂecting degree of acceptance were not proposed in their own right,
but determined by or generalized from the epistemic entrenchment relation
(Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson [5]). So these models are essentially diﬀerent from
the approach investigated here in both respects of the way of representing
the degree of acceptance and the way of constructing the revision operations.
The structure of this paper will be organized in this way: in the next
section, we will introduce some formal preliminaries, in particular, we will
diﬀerentiate two diﬀerent kinds of select-direct sentential revision derived
from descriptor revision, i.e. dependent revision and independent revision.
In Section 3, we will specify the believability relations that can generate
the dependent revision, which are derived from so called standard epistemic
proximity relations. Section 4 will be devoted to the case of the independent
revision, which is proved to be obtainable through a set of believability rela-
tions axiomatically characterized with four weak postulates. In Section 5,
more potential properties on believability relations and their impact on the
properties of the relevant revision operations will be studied. As it has been
shown that traditional AGM revision operations (Alchourro´n et al. [1]) can
be reconstructed in the select-direct way (Hansson [10]), we will investigate
in Section 6 whether they can also be reconstructed using believability rela-
tions as well as the possible connection between the believability relations
and the epistemic entrenchment relations. Section 7 concludes.
1In this sense, the believability relation is the same as a restricted variant of epis-
temic proximity relation on descriptors of the most simple form (such as Bϕ, Bψ, etc.).
The reason why we deﬁne it on sentences but not on descriptors is mainly for simplicity
in expression and convenience in comparison with the epistemic entrenchment relation
(Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson [5]), which is also deﬁned on sentences.
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2. Preliminaries
The object language L is deﬁned inductively by a set of propositional vari-
ables and the truth functional operations ¬,∧,∨ and → in the usual way.
Sentences in L will be denoted by lower-case Greek letters in the second half
of the alphabet and sets of such sentences by upper-case Roman letters. Cn is
a consequence operation for L satisfying supraclassicality (if ϕ can be derived
from A by classical truth-functional logic, then ϕ ∈ Cn(A)), compactness
(if ϕ ∈ Cn(A), then there exists some ﬁnite B ⊆ A such that ϕ ∈ Cn(B))
and deduction property (ϕ ∈ Cn(A ∪ {ψ}) if and only if ψ → ϕ ∈ Cn(A)).
X 
 ϕ is an alternative notation for ϕ ∈ Cn(X). {ϕ} 
 ψ will be simply
written as ϕ 
 ψ. ϕ ≡ ψ means ϕ 
 ψ and ψ 
 ϕ.
The beliefs of an agent are represented by a belief set, which is a set
X ⊆ L such that X = Cn(X). K is ﬁxed to denote the set of the original
beliefs of the agent. We assume that K is consistent unless stated otherwise.
An atomic belief descriptor is a sentence Bϕ with ϕ ∈ L. The symbol
B is not part of the object language L by which the agent’s beliefs are
expressed. A molecular belief descriptor is a truth-functional combination
of atomic descriptors. A composite belief descriptor (in short: descriptor;
denoted by upper-case Greek letters) is a set2 of molecular descriptors. Bϕ
is satisfied by a belief set X if and only if ϕ ∈ X. Conditions of satisfaction
for molecular descriptors are deﬁned inductively, hence (letting α and β
stand for molecular descriptors) X satisﬁes ¬α if and only if it does not
satisfy α, it satisﬁes α ∨ β if and only if it satisﬁes either α or β, etc. It
satisﬁes a composite descriptor Φ if and only if it satisﬁes all its elements.
X  Φ denotes that X satisﬁes Φ and Φ  Ξ that all belief sets satisfying
Φ also satisfy Ξ (Hansson [8]).
We use upmodels to denote the descriptor B∧¬B. It is easy to see that there
is no belief set satisfying upmodels.
Descriptor revision on belief set K is performed with a uniﬁed operator
◦ such that K ◦ Φ is an operation with Φ as its success condition. Several
constructions for concrete descriptor revision operations can be found in
Hansson [8], of which the relational model deﬁned as follows is of special
importance.
2We usually omit the brackets if the descriptor is a singleton.
3The deﬁnition presented here is more general than the original one in Hansson [8] as
we introduce one more parameter S.
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Definition 2.1 (Hansson [8], modified3). Let S be any set of descriptors,
(X,)S is a relational select-direct model (in short: relational model) with
respect to K if and only if it satisﬁes:4
(X1) X is a set of belief sets.
(X2) K ∈ X.
(1) K  X for every X ∈ X.
(2) For any Φ ∈ S, if {X ∈ X | X  Φ} (we denote it as XΦ) is not
empty, then it has a unique -minimal element denoted by XΦ<.
A descriptor revision ◦ on K is based on (or determined by) some rela-
tional model (X,)S with respect to K if and only if for any Φ,




< if Φ ∈ S and XΦ is not empty,
K otherwise.
The intuitive meaning of X is an outcome set which represents all the
potential outcomes under several belief change patterns.  (with the strict
part <) is an ordering used to select the best among candidates satisfying a
certain success condition. Condition (2) guarantees that this kind of direct-
selection is achievable for any success condition which is satisﬁable in X. To
some extent, descriptor revision is in a more abstract level than the AGM
revision. Consider the Deﬁnition 2.1, for any descriptor revision ◦, it assumes
that there exists an outcome set which contains all the potential outcomes
of the operation ◦, but it says little about what these outcomes should be
like. In contrast, in the AGM framework, the belief change is supposed to
perform in a way of preserving consistence and reserving information as
much as possible. Therefore, the intersection in the AGM framework as a
useful tool to construct the intended outcome becomes dispensable in the
context of descriptor revision.
Sentential revision operation on K can be reconstructed from descriptor
revision in the following way:
Definition 2.2 (Hansson [8]). Let ◦ be some descriptor revision on K. A
sentential revision  on K is based on (or determined by) ◦ if and only if
K  ϕ = K ◦ Bϕ for all ϕ ∈ L.
4We will drop the subscript S and phrase “with respect to K” if this does not aﬀect
the understanding, and use Xϕ and Xϕ< to denote X
Bϕ and XBϕ< for simplicity.
5Note that given that (X, ) is a relational model, since K ∈ X and K  X for all
X ∈ X, X is equivalent to the domain of . So (X, ) can be represented faithfully by 
only.
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Let (X,)S be any relational model, we name it global relational model
if S contains all descriptors, and sentential relational model if S = {Bϕ |
ϕ ∈ L}. Accordingly, ◦ will be called global descriptor revision if it is based
on some global relational model, and sentential descriptor revision if it is
determined by some sentential relational model. With these two kinds of
descriptor revision operations, at least two types of sentential revision oper-
ations can be constructed.6
Definition 2.3. 1. A sentential operation  on K is a dependent select-
direct sentential revision (in short: dependent revision) if and only if it
is based on a global descriptor revision ◦.
2. An operator  on K is a independent select-direct sentential revision (in
short: independent revision) if and only if it is determined by a sentential
descriptor revision.
It is easy to see that the dependent revision operations are special cases of
independent ones. Compared with the independent, properties of dependent
revision are more subtle since they are sensitive to those of other change
patterns. How to axiomatically characterize the dependent revision is still
an open problem. But the axiomatization of the independent revision can be
obtained as an immediate corollary of the Theorem 1 in Zhang & Hansson
[16]. In the next two sections, we will show that both of these operations
can be reconstructed by the believability relations satisfying certain suitable
conditions.
3. Believability Relations for Dependent Revision
As we have mentioned in Section 1, a relation ∗ (with the strict part ≺∗ and
the symmetric part ∗) on descriptors called epistemic proximity relation
was introduced in Hansson [9]. Ψ∗ Ξ intuitively means that Ψ is at least
as epistemically proximal as Ξ. It is assumed that a standard epistemic
proximity relation should satisfy the following ﬁve postulates:7
6These two kinds of sentential operations (and the associated descriptor revision opera-
tions) were not explicitly diﬀerentiated in previous work, though some studies on the same
operations of diﬀerent names have been separately done in Hansson [8,10] and Zhang &
Hansson [16].
7In Hansson [9], epistemic proximity relation was just referred to the relations satisfying
the ﬁve postulates. Here we use this term in a more general way and call relations satisfying
these postulates standard epistemic proximity relations instead.
Believability Relations 43
transitivity: If Φ∗ Ψ and Ψ∗ Ξ, then Φ∗ Ξ
counter-dominance: If Φ  Ψ, then Ψ∗ Φ
coupling: If Φ∗Ψ then Φ∗Φ ∪ Ψ
amplification: Either Φ ∪ {Bϕ}∗ Ψ or Φ ∪ {¬Bϕ}∗ Ψ
absurdity avoidance: Φ∗ {Bϕ,¬Bϕ} for some Φ
It was also shown that these relations can be used to reconstruct the
global descriptor revision.
Proposition 3.1 (Hansson [9]). Let ◦ be any descriptor revision operation
on K. Then, the following two propositions are equivalent.
1. ◦ is a global descriptor revision operation on K.
2. ◦ is derived from some standard epistemic proximity relation with respect
to K8 in the following way:
〈∗ to ◦〉 K ◦ Φ =
{
{ψ | Φ∗Φ ∪ {Bψ}} if Φ≺∗upmodels,
K otherwise.
Hansson further proposed that a set of believability relations can be
derived from the standard epistemic proximity relation in the following way:
〈∗ to 〉− ϕ  ψ if and only if Bϕ∗ Bψ.
However, some information contained in the original epistemic proximity
relation will be lost after this kind of restriction. Consider two relations
of epistemic proximity ∗ 1 and ∗ 2 that respectively satisﬁes Bϕ∗ 1upmodels∗ 1Bψ
and Bϕ∗ 2Bψ∗ 2upmodels. If the agent is in the belief status represented by ∗ 1,
she will not accept ψ as her new belief in any case. The situation is diﬀerent
if she is in the belief status represented by ∗ 2. However, this diﬀerence
cannot be expressed by the believability relations derived from ∗ 1 and ∗ 2
through the way of 〈∗ to 〉−. As a result, the dependent revision derived
from the global descriptor revision is not able to be reconstructed by these
believability (see the Observation 5 in Hansson [9]).
However, as we will show in what follows, this limitation can be resolved
by a simple modiﬁcation on the derivation method 〈∗ to 〉−. Consider
the believability relations derived from the standard epistemic proximity
relation in this way:
〈∗ to 〉 ϕ  ψ if and only if Bψ≺∗upmodels and Bϕ∗ Bψ.
8∗ is with respect to K if and only if K  ⋃{Φ | Φ∗B} (See Hansson [9], p. 78).
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Although 〈∗ to 〉 is a little diﬀerent from 〈∗ to 〉− proposed in Hans-
son [9], still let us call relations obtained through this way H-believability
relations. It is easy to see that in this way if upmodels∗ ϕ then ϕ will not be in the
domain of the derived . This modiﬁcation is crucial for the main result of
this section as follows.
Note that Ref() denote the domain of .
Theorem 3.2. Let  be any sentential revision operation on K. Then, the
following two propositions are equivalent.
1.  is a dependent revision operation on K.
2.  is derived from some H-believability relation  in the following way:
〈 to 〉 K  ϕ =
{
{ψ | ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ} if ϕ ∈ Ref(),
K otherwise.
Theorem 3.2 shows that H-believability relations are faithful alternative
models for dependent revision operations, though the axiomatization of this
kind of believability relations has not been settled. In the next section, we
will study the believability relations for constructing independent revision
operations. A positive result is that an axiomatic characterization of these
relations can be obtained.
4. Believability Relations for Independent Revision
In this section, we will prove that believability relations which exactly gener-
ate all the independent revision operations on K through the way of 〈 to 〉
can be axiomatically characterized by following postulates:
weak transitivity: Let ϕ  ψ and ψ 
 ϕ, then (i) ϕ  ξ if and only if
ψ  ξ, and (ii) ξ  ϕ if and only if ξ  ψ.
weak coupling: If ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ  ϕ ∧ ξ, then ϕ  ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ξ).
relative counter-dominance: If ϕ ∈ Ref() and ϕ 
 ψ, then ψ  ϕ.
relative minimality: ϕ ∈ K if and only if ϕ ∈ Ref() and ϕ  ψ for all
ψ ∈ Ref().
It is arguable that these postulates represent a minimum set of condi-
tions a believability relation should satisfy. Weak transitivity is just a very
weak version of transitivity which is assumed for almost all orderings. The
rationale for weak coupling is that if the agent will consequently add ψ and
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ξ to her beliefs in case of accepting ϕ, then she also add ψ ∧ ξ to her beliefs
in this case. This is reasonable if we assume that the beliefs of the agent are
represented by a belief set. The justiﬁcation of relative counter-dominance
is that if ϕ logically entails ψ, and K must be revised to incorporate either
ϕ or ψ, then it will be a smaller change to accept ϕ rather than to accept
ψ, because then ψ must be added too, if we assume that the beliefs of the
agent is closed under consequence operation. Relative minimality is justiﬁ-
able since it needs to do nothing to add ϕ to K if it is already in K. So we
call relations characterized by these postulates basic believability relations
with respect to K. It is easy to see that the H-believability relations satisfy
these four conditions.
In what follows, we prove the equivalence between the sentential rela-
tional models and the basic believability relations in terms of their expres-
sive power for constructing revision operations. The work can be divided
into the following three lemmas.
Note that we use [ϕ] to denote the set {ψ | ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ} for simplicity
Lemma 4.1. Let (X,) be any sentential relational model and  a relation
on L retrieved from (X,) in the following way:
〈 to 〉 ϕ  ψ if and only if Xϕ< and Xψ< exist and Xϕ<  Xψ<.
Then,  is a basic believability relation.
Lemma 4.2. Let  be any basic believability relation. Then, a binary relation
 on the power set of L can be constructed from  in the following way:
〈 to 〉 X  Y if and only if X = [ϕ], Y = [ψ] and ϕ  ψ.
Moreover, (X,) with X = Ref() is a sentential relational model for revi-
sion and  can be retrieved from (X,) through 〈 to 〉.
We say that a sentential revision  is based on (or determined by) some
sentential (global) relational model if it is based on the sentential (global)
descriptor revision determined by this model, and  is based on (or deter-
mined by) some believability relation if it is generated from this relation in
the way of 〈 to 〉. Now we can state the third lemma as follows.
Lemma 4.3. Let (X,) be any sentential relational model and  a believ-
ability relation retrieved from (X,) through 〈 to 〉. Then, a revision
operation is based on (X,) if and only if it is based on .
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 jointly show that all basic believability relations
can be derived from the sentential relational models. Moreover, Lemma 4.3
says that the sentential revision based on certain sentential relational model
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is the same as the revision determined by the believability relation that
the model gives rise to. Hence, the set of the sentential revision operations
generated from basic believability relation coincide with the independent
revision operations. Moreover, as we have mentioned in the last paragraph
of the Section 2, the independent revision can be axiomatically characterized
with several postulates on the operators. We present these results together
in the following representation theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Let  be any operation on K. Then, the following three propo-
sitions are equivalent:
1.  is an independent revision.
2.  is generated from some basic believability relation  through 〈 to 〉.
3.  satisfies the following conditions:
Cn(K  ϕ) = K  ϕ (closure)
If K  ϕ = K, then ϕ ∈ K  ϕ (relative success)
If ϕ ∈ K, then K  ϕ = K (confirmation)
If ψ ∈ K  ϕ, then ψ ∈ K  ψ (regularity)
If ψ ∈ K  ϕ and ϕ ∈ K  ψ, then K  ϕ = K  ψ (reciprocity)
Although the postulates in Theorem 4.4 are so weak that they actually
characterize a broad set of operations, the maxi-choice revision proposed in
Alchourro´n & Makinson [2] is not covered by them since postulate “reci-
procity” cannot be derived from the ﬁrst six AGM postulates (Alchourro´n
& Makinson [2]). However, there exist other constructions for descriptor
revision (and hence for the derived select-direct sentential revision), in one
of which the direct choice among the outcome set is speciﬁed by a selecting
function instead of the ordering  in Deﬁnition 1. The resulting revision
operation from this setting is even weaker and hence maxi-choice revision
is a special case of it. (For more details on the construction for descriptor
revision using selecting function, see Hansson [8], p. 958)
Besides, Lemma 4.2 tells us that 〈 to 〉 is an injection from basic
believability relations to the sentential relational model. But it is easy to
ﬁnd an example in which two diﬀerent sentential relational models generate
the same believability relation through 〈 to 〉. So it is not a bijection.
However, with some restriction, one-to-one correspondences between these
two kinds of constructions are obtainable. We will present some this kind of
results in the next section.
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5. More Properties on Believability Relations
The properties of the basic believability relations introduced and studied
in the previous section does not necessarily cover all plausible properties of
the believability relations. In this section, we will impose some additional
properties on the basic believability relations and investigate their conse-
quences for properties of the equivalent sentential relational models and
derived revision operations.
5.1. Transitivity
Given that ϕ  ψ is explained as meaning that it is not more diﬃcult for
the subject to become to believe ϕ than ψ, the postulates characterizing the
basic believability relations appear to be a bit too weak. It seems that even
in a very general setting a suitable believability relation at least needs to
satisfy:
transitivity: If ϕ  ψ and ψ  ξ, then ϕ  ξ.
We call the basic believability relations satisfying this additional condition
transitive believability relations.
The main goal of this subsection is just to argue for the plausibility
and generality of the transitive believability relation through a formal result
demonstrating that there is no distinction between the transitive and general
basic believability relations from the angle of expressive power.
As a preparation, we prove that 〈 to 〉 (or 〈 to 〉) is a bijection
between the transitive believability relations and a special subset of senten-
tial relational model which is deﬁned as follows.
Definition 5.1. (X,) is a canonical sentential model with respect to K if
and only if it is a sentential relational model additionally satisfying:
(3)  is reﬂexive, i.e. X  X for all X ∈ X, and transitive.
(∗1) For any X ∈ X, there exists ϕ such that X = Xϕ<.
It is easy to see that there exist sentential relational models which are
not canonical sentential models. However, the following lemma shows that
these two kinds of models are equivalent in expressive power. That is the
reason why we call models deﬁned in this way canonical.
Lemma 5.2. Let (X,) be any sentential relational model. Then, a canonical
sentential model (Y,′) can be constructed as follows:
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Y = {X ∈ X | there is no D ⊆ X such that for any Y ∈ D, Y <
X and X ⊆ ⋃ D}.
′ (with the strict part <′) is the transitive closure of  ∩(X × X).
Moreover, A revision operator is determined by (X,) if and only if it is
based on (Y,′).
Now we demonstrate that a bijection between the transitive believability
relations and the canonical relational models can be obtained by 〈 to 〉
and 〈 to 〉.
Lemma 5.3. 1. Let  be any transitive believability relation and let (X,)
be obtained by 〈 to 〉 from . Then, (X,) is a canonical sentential
model and  can be retrieved from (X,) by means of 〈 to 〉.
2. Let (X,) be any canonical sentential model and  retrieved from 
through 〈 to 〉. Then,  is a transitive believability relation and
(X,) can be reconstructed from  by means of 〈 to 〉.
From these two lemmas and the Lemma 4.3 in previous section, the result
we claimed previously follows immediately.
Theorem 5.4. A revision operator is based on some basic believability rela-
tion if and only if it is determined by some transitive believability relation.
Hence, we can focus on the transitive believability relation or the subsets
of them in the following part of this paper without loss of generality. And
we will see that correspondence between the transitive believability relations
and the canonical sentential models oﬀers us a useful tool to investigate
properties of the revision operations based on the believability relations.
5.2. Exhaustiveness, Maximality, Coupling and Completeness
Another natural strengthening of basic believability relations is to require
their domain to contain all sentences from L, i.e. every  should satisfy:
exhaustiveness : Ref() = L.
Given that  is a transitive believability relation, it is obvious that 
satisﬁes exhaustiveness if and only if it satisﬁes:
counter-dominance: If ϕ 
 ψ, then ψ  ϕ.
minimality: ϕ ∈ K if and only if ϕ  ψ for all ψ.
Moreover, that a believability relation  satisﬁes exhaustiveness means
that every ϕ from L is possible to be accepted by the agent. It is plausible
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to suppose that in this situation it is strictly more diﬃcult for a rational
agent to accept or believe ⊥ than to believe any non-falsum. In other words,
 should satisfy:
maximality: If ψ  ϕ for all ψ, then ϕ ≡ ⊥.
Weak coupling has been the only untouched postulate of those the char-
acterizing basic believability relations as yet. All the same, there is a natural
strengthening of it as follows:
coupling: If ϕ  ψ and ϕ  ξ, then ϕ  ψ ∧ ξ.
We call believability relations characterized by transitivity, coupling,
counter-dominance, maximality and minimality strengthened believability
relations. Let K = Cn({}) and let the relation  on L be deﬁned as ϕ  ψ
if and only if ψ 
 ϕ. It is easy to see that  is a strengthened believability
relation with respect to K but does not satisfy the condition:
completeness: ϕ  ψ or ψ  ϕ.
We call strengthened believability relation additionally satisfying com-
pleteness quasi-linear believability relation, since it is easy to see that a lin-
ear order can be obtained on equivalence classes generated by the symmet-
ric part of a quasi-linear believability relation. Moreover, the corresponding
sentential relational models obtained by 〈 to 〉 from these two types of
believability relations are called strengthened sentential models and linear
strengthened sentential models respectively. The following theorem explains
why they are named in this way.
Theorem 5.5. Let  be a transitive believability relation and (X,) a
canonical sentential model obtained by 〈 to 〉 from . Then,
1.  in addition satisfies exhaustiveness and maximality if and only if
(X,) additionally satisfies
(∗2): For any ϕ ≡ ⊥, Xϕ< < Cn({⊥}).
2.  in addition satisfies coupling if and only if (X,) additionally satisfies
(4):  is anti-symmetric, i.e. for any X, Y ∈ X, if X  Y and Y  X,
then X = Y .
3.  in addition satisfies completeness if and only if (X,) additionally
satisfies
(5):  is complete, i.e. X  Y or Y  X for all X, Y ∈ X.
50 L. Zhang
Theorem 5.5 summarises the impact of strengthening the basic believ-
ability relations on the properties of the correspondent relational model.
One the other hand, the correspondent impact on the properties of the gen-
erated sentential revision operations is demonstrated in the following two
representation theorems.
Theorem 5.6. Let  be any sentential revision on K. Then,  is determined
by a transitive believability relation satisfying exhaustiveness and maximality
if and only if it satisfies closure, confirmation, reciprocity and the following
two postulates:
ϕ ∈ K  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L. (success)
If ¬ϕ /∈ Cn(∅), then K  ϕ is consistent. (consistency)
Theorem 5.7. Let  be any sentential revision operation on K, then the
following propositions are equivalent:
1.  can be constructed from some strengthened believability relation through
〈 to 〉.
2.  can be constructed from some quasi-linear believability relation through
〈 to 〉.
3.  satisfies closure, confirmation, success, consistency and following pos-
tulate:
(8) Given n ∈ N, if for every 0  i < n, ϕi ∈ Kϕi+1 and ϕn ∈ Kϕ0,
then K  ϕ0 = K  ϕ2 = · · · = K  ϕn. (strong reciprocity)
These two representation theorems show that sentential revision opera-
tions generated from the strengthened versions of believability relations can
also be axiomatically characterized by certain plausible postulates, of which
the strong reciprocity is closely relative to a non-monotonic reasoning rule
named as “loop” introduced in Klaus et al. [12]. For more discussion on this,
see Makinson & Ga¨rdenfors [13].
Moreover, although the quasi-linear believability relations are a proper
subset of strengthened believability relations, Theorem 5.7 shows that they
have the same expressive power. It was proved in Hansson [8] that if (X,)
is a global relational model, then  is linear. So as a consequence of The-
orem 5.7, if a revision operation  is a dependent revision based on some
global relational model satisfying (2), then it is also an independent revi-
sion derived from some sentential relational model (X,) with  is linear.
But it is still unknown whether the opposite implication also holds. If so,
with the results obtained in this paper, the axiomatic characterizations of
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dependent revision operations and H-believability relations can be obtained
immediately.
6. Relationship to AGM Revision and Entrenchment Relations
6.1. Believability Relations for AGM Revision
The classic AGM revision operation was introduced in Alchourro´n, et al. [1]
as follows:
Definition 6.1 (Alchourro´n et al. [1]). For any belief set K, an operation 
on K is called AGM revision operation if and only if it satisﬁes the following
eight AGM postulates:
closure: Cn(K  ϕ) = K  ϕ
success: ϕ ∈ K  ϕ
inclusion: K  ϕ ⊆ Cn(K ∪ {ϕ})
vacuity: If ¬ϕ /∈ K, then Cn(K ∪ {ϕ}) ⊆ K  ϕ
consistency: If ¬ϕ /∈ Cn(∅), then K  ϕ is consistent under Cn
extensionality: If ϕ ↔ ψ ∈ Cn(∅), then K  ϕ = K  ψ
superexpansion: K  (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ Cn(K  ϕ ∪ {ψ})
subexpansion: If ¬ψ /∈ K  ϕ, then Cn(K  ϕ ∪ {ψ}) ⊆ K  (ϕ ∧ ψ).
Note that we assume that K is consistent. It is easy to see that conﬁr-
mation can be derived from inclusion and vacuity under this assumption.
And it has been proved in Makinson & Ga¨rdenfors [13] that strong reci-
procity holds for all operations which satisfy those eight AGM postulates.
So, by Theorem 5.7, all AGM revision operations on K can be generated
from strengthened believability relation with respect to K.
A closely related result was given in Hansson [10] from the point of view
of model construction. In that paper a set of conditions on relational models
was speciﬁed and it was shown that a revision operation is based on some
linear strengthened sentential model satisfying those conditions if and only
if it satisﬁes the eight AGM postulates.
Can we similarly ﬁnd the conditions characterizing the believability rela-
tions that exactly give rise to all the AGM revision operations? There is a
positive answer.
Consider following two conditions:
(1) If  ≺ ϕ → ψ, then ϕ ≺ ϕ ∧ ψ.
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(2) If  ≺ ¬ϕ and   ϕ → ψ, then ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ.
And their “iteration” versions:
(	1) If ϕ ≺ ϕ ∧ (ψ → ξ), then ϕ ∧ ψ ≺ ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ξ).
(	2) If ϕ ≺ ϕ ∧ ¬ψ and ϕ  ϕ ∧ (ψ → ξ), then ϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ξ).
Given  satisﬁes transitivity and counter-dominance, it is easy to see
that the (	1) and (	2) imply the (1) and (2). The following theorem
shows that if we further strengthen the believability relations with (	1) and
(	2), we can construct exactly the AGM belief revision operations from these
strengthened relations.
Theorem 6.2. 1. If a revision operation is based on some strengthened
believability relation satisfying (1) and (2), then it satisfies the first
six AGM postulates.
2. A revision operation is determined by some strengthened believability
relation satisfying (	1) and (	2) if and only if it satisfies all eight AGM
postulates.
The fact that AGM revision can be reconstructed in the select-direct
way to some extent indicates that it is hard to draw a clear line between
“select-and-intersect” and “select-direct” revision operations. It is possibly
not suitable to regard the “select-direct” approach as an opposite to the
“select-and-intersect” one, instead they are more like two perspectives at
diﬀerent levels.
6.2. Epistemic Entrenchment Relation
In what follows, we discuss the connection between the strengthened believ-
ability relation and the so called standard epistemic entrenchment relation
which was ﬁrstly introduced in Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson [5] in the following
way:
Definition 6.3 (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson [5]). A binary relation  (with
the symmetric part .=) is a standard epistemic entrenchment relation with
respect to K if and only if it satisﬁes:
Transitivity: If ϕψ and ψξ, then ϕξ.
Dominance: If ϕ 
 ψ, then ϕψ.
Conjunctiveness: ϕϕ ∧ ψ or ψϕ ∧ ψ.
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∗-Minimality9: ϕ /∈ K if and only if ϕψ for all ψ.
∗-Maximality: If ψϕ for all ψ, then 
 ϕ.
Consider a variant of strengthened believability relations which is deﬁned
as follows.
Definition 6.4. A relation  on L is a maximal outcome believability
relation if and only if it is a strengthened believability relation satisfying
maxi-outcome: For every ϕ, ψ ∈ L, ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ or ϕ  ϕ ∧ ¬ψ.
The intuitive meaning of maximal outcome believability relations is that
the possible outcomes (including K) of revision based on these relations
with inputs of consistent formulas are all maximal consistent sets. In other
words, in these cases, believing or accepting ¬ϕ is equivalent to giving up
ϕ. So a bridge can be built from maximal outcome believability relations to
standard entrenchment relations in the following way:
〈 to 〉 ϕψ if and only if ¬ϕ  ¬ψ.
In fact, the following theorem shows that from the maximal outcome
believability relations we can exactly derive through 〈 to 〉 all the stan-
dard epistemic entrenchment relations satisfying the following property:
() If ϕ .= ψ, then ϕ .= φ ∨ ψ.
Theorem 6.5. Let K be any maximal consistent belief set.
1. Let  be a maximal outcome believability relation with respect to K and 
obtained by 〈 to 〉 from , then  is a standard epistemic entrenchment
relation with respect to K satisfying ().
2. Let  be a standard epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K
satisfying () and  obtained from  by means of the following definition:
〈 to 〉 ϕ  ψ if and only if ¬ϕ¬ψ.
Then,  is a maximal outcome believability relation with respect to K
and  can be reconstructed from  by 〈 to 〉.
It is interesting to make a further comparison between the strengthened
believability relations and the standard epistemic entrenchment relations.
A direct translation between these two orderings is expected as both of
9We use preﬁx “∗-” to distinct these versions of minimality and maximality from those
for the believability relations.
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them can exactly generate the AGM revision.10 Moreover, weakened version
of believability relation (such as the basic believability relations) and its
connections with the basic entrenchment proposed in Rott [14] are also worth
being studied. We left all these as future work.
7. Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to show that select-direct revision opera-
tions generated by descriptor revisions can be reconstructed from a type of
relation on sentences called believability relations. More speciﬁcally, so called
H-believability relations and basic believability relations were proved to be
faithful alternative models for the dependent select-direct revision and the
independent select-direct revision respectively. Particularly, an axiomatic
characterization of the basic believability relation was obtained. In Section
5, we investigated more potential properties of the believability relations
except those characterizing the basic believability relations and obtained
a strengthened variant of believability relations. This type of relations is
of special interest since independent revision operations constructed from
relational models of the most well-ordered form, i.e.  in (X,) is a linear
ordering, can be exactly derived from them, and all traditional AGM revision
operation can be exactly generated from certain subset of them. Moreover,
we showed that there is a close connection between the standard epistemic
entrenchment relation and the strengthened believability relation. All these
facts together conﬁrm the importance and plausibility of the believability
relation as a construction for revision operations.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof (for Theorem 3.2). Let ∗ be any proximity relation and  a H-
believability relation derived from it through 〈∗ to 〉. Furthermore, let ◦
be descriptor revision derived from ∗ through 〈∗ to ◦〉 and  the sentential
revision from  through〈 to 〉. By Proposition 3.2, ◦ is a global descriptor
revision. So according to the deﬁnition of dependent revision operation, we
only need to prove that K  ϕ = K ◦ Bϕ for every ϕ. There are only two
cases.
Case 1: Let ϕ ∈ Ref(), then it follows that Bϕ≺∗upmodels by 〈∗ to 〉. So K ◦
Bϕ = {ψ | Bϕ∗Bϕ∧Bψ}. By counter-dominance of ∗ , Bϕ∧Bψ∗B(ϕ∧ψ).
Moreover, it follows from Bϕ≺∗upmodels that B(ϕ ∧ ψ)≺∗upmodels since ∗ satisﬁes transi-
tivity and counter-dominance. So, due to 〈∗ to 〉, ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ if and only
if Bϕ∗B(ϕ ∧ ψ). Thus, K  ϕ = {ψ | ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ} = {ψ | Bϕ∗B(ϕ ∧ ψ)} =
{ψ | Bϕ∗Bϕ ∧ Bψ} = K ◦ Bϕ.
Case 2: Let ϕ /∈ Ref(). By 〈∗ to 〉, it follows that Bϕ/≺∗ upmodels since Bϕ∗ Bϕ
due to counter-dominance of ∗ . Thus, K  ϕ = K = K ◦ Bϕ.
In order to prove Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, we ﬁrst prove the following two
observations on sentential relational models and relations, which are also
useful in some other proofs.
Observation 7.1. Let  be any binary relation on L satisfying weak tran-
sitivity and relative counter-dominance. Then,
1. These three propositions are equivalent: (i) ϕ ∈ [ϕ], (ii) [ϕ] = ∅ and
(iii) ϕ ∈ Ref().
2. Let [ϕ] = [ψ]. (i) If ϕ  ξ, then ψ  ξ, and (ii) if ξ  ϕ, then ξ  ψ.
Proof. 1. From (i) to (ii): Let ϕ ∈ [ϕ], then [ϕ] = ∅. From (ii) to (iii):
Let [ϕ] = ∅, then there exists ψ such that ϕ  ϕ∧ψ. So ϕ ∈ Ref(). From
(iii) to (i): Let ϕ ∈ Ref(). Since ϕ 
 ϕ∧ϕ, by relative counter-dominance,
ϕ ∧ ϕ  ϕ. So ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ Ref() and hence ϕ  ϕ ∧ ϕ by relative counter-
dominance again. Thus, ϕ  ϕ ∧ ϕ, i.e. ϕ ∈ [ϕ].
2. Let [ϕ] = [ψ]. (i): Let ϕ  ξ, then ϕ ∈ Ref() and hence ϕ ∈ [ψ] and
ψ ∈ [ψ] due to a result in the ﬁrst part of this observation. It follows that
ϕ  ϕ∧ψ and ψ  ψ∧ϕ. So ϕ∧ψ  ξ due to weak transitivity. Moreover, we
can conclude ψ  ϕ ∧ ψ from ψ  ψ ∧ ϕ due to relative counter-dominance
and weak transitivity. Thus, ξ  ψ due to weak transitivity. (ii): The proof
is similar to that for (i).
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Observation 7.2. Let (X,) be any sentential relational model and ψ 
 ϕ,
then the following three propositions are equivalent: (i) ψ ∈ Xϕ<, (ii) Xψ< 
X
ϕ





Proof. From (i) to (ii): Let ψ ∈ Xϕ<, then Xψ = ∅ and Xψ< exists. More-
over, it follows from ψ ∈ Xϕ< that Xϕ< ∈ Xψ. Thus, Xψ<  Xϕ<. From (ii) to
(iii): Let Xψ<  Xϕ<. Since ψ 
 ϕ, ϕ ∈ Xψ<, i.e. Xψ< ∈ Xϕ. Thus, Xϕ< = Xψ<
since Xϕ< is the unique minimal element in Xϕ. From (iii) to (i): Obvious.
Proof (for Lemma 4.1). We only need to check that  satisﬁes the four
postulates for the basic believability relation.
Weak transitivity : Let ψ 





< due to observation 7.2. Hence, ξ  ϕ if and only if Xξ<  Xϕ< due
to 〈 to 〉, and if and only if Xξ<  Xψ< since Xϕ< = Xψ<, and if and only if
ξ  ψ due to 〈 to 〉. And by a similar argument, we can also prove that
ϕ  ξ if and only if ψ  ξ. Thus, weak transitivity holds for .
Weak coupling : Let ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ  ϕ ∧ ξ, then Xϕ∧ψ< = Xϕ< = Xφ∧ξ< by
〈 to 〉 and observation 7.2. So ψ ∧ ξ ∈ Xϕ<, and hence Xϕ< = Xϕ∧(ψ∧ξ)<
due to observation 7.2. Thus, ϕ  ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ξ) by 〈 to 〉.
Relative counter-dominance: Let ϕ ∈ Ref(), then Xϕ< exists due to
〈 to 〉. Furthermore, let ϕ 
 ψ, then ψ ∈ Xϕ< since ϕ ∈ Xϕ< and
Cn(Xϕ<) = X
ϕ
<. It follows that X
ψ
< exists and X
ψ
<  Xϕ< due to observa-
tion 7.2. Thus, ψ  ϕ due to 〈 to 〉.
Relative minimality : ϕ ∈ K if and only if Xϕ< = K due to K = X< and
observation 7.2, and if and only if Xϕ<  Xψ< for all ψ such that Xψ< exists,
and if and only if ϕ ∈ Ref() and ϕ  ψ for all ψ ∈ Ref() due to
〈 to 〉.
Proof (for Lemma 4.2). Part 1: The relative minimality of  guaran-
tees that X is not empty and it follows from observation 7.1 that the map
〈 to 〉 is well-deﬁned. Hence, there exists (X,) which can be constructed
from  by 〈 to 〉.
Part 2: Now we check that (X,) meets the requirements for the sentential
relational model.
(X1): Let[ϕ] ∈ X ,then ϕ ∈ Ref() by 〈 to 〉 and hence [ϕ] = ∅ due
to observation 7.1. Moreover, let ψ ∈ [ϕ] and ξ ∈ [ϕ], then ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ
and ϕ  ϕ ∧ ξ by deﬁnition of [ϕ]. It follows that ϕ  ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ξ) by
weak coupling. Furthermore, let ψ ∧ ξ 
 χ, then ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ξ) 
 ϕ ∧ χ. So
ϕ ∧ χ  ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ξ) by relative counter-dominance and hence ϕ ∧ χ  ϕ by
weak transitivity. Moreover, ϕ  ϕ ∧ χ by relative counter-dominance. So,
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ϕ  ϕ ∧ χ, i.e. χ ∈ [ϕ]. Hence, Cn([ϕ]) = [ϕ]. Thus, X is a set of belief
sets.
(X2): Since  ∈ K,  ∈ Ref() by the relative minimality of . Hence,
ϕ ∈ K if and only if ϕ ∈ Ref() and ϕ  ψ for all ϕ due to relative min-
imality of , and if and only if ϕ   due to relative counter-dominance
and weak transitivity of , and if and only if    ∧ ϕ, i.e. ϕ ∈ [], due
to relative counter-dominance and weak transitivity of . Hence, K = [].
Moreover,  ∈ Ref() yields [] ∈ X by 〈 to 〉. Thus, K ∈ X.
(1):   ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Ref() due to the relative counter-dominance of .
Moreover, K = [] as we have showed. Thus, K  X for all X ∈ X due to
〈 to 〉.
(2): Let Xϕ = ∅, then there exists [ψ] ∈ X such that ϕ ∈ [ψ]. It follows
that ϕ ∈ Ref() and hence [ϕ] ∈ Xϕ due to 〈 to 〉 and observation 7.1.
Now we show that [ϕ] = X
ϕ
<. (i) For any ξ such that [ξ] ∈ Xϕ, it holds that
ϕ ∈ [ξ], i.e. ξ  ξ ∧ ϕ. It follows that ϕ  ξ by relative counter-dominance
and weak transitivity of . So [ϕ]  [ξ] due to 〈 to 〉. Moreover, sup-
pose for contradiction that there exits [ξ] ∈ Xϕ such that [ξ] = [ϕ] and
[ξ]  [ϕ]. It follows by 〈 to 〉 that ϕ  ξ and ξ  ξ ∧ ϕ since ϕ ∈ [ξ]
and [ϕ]  [ξ]. Let χ be any sentence in [ξ], then it follows from ϕ ∈ [ξ]
and Cn([ξ]) = [ξ] that ξ  ξ ∧ (ϕ ∧ χ). So ϕ  ξ ∧ (ϕ ∧ χ) due to ϕ  ξ
and weak transitivity. Moreover, ξ∧(ϕ∧χ) 
 ϕ∧χ and ϕ∧χ 
 ϕ. Hence, by
relative counter-dominance and weak transitivity, ϕ  ϕ ∧ χ, i.e. χ ∈ [ϕ].
We can prove that if χ ∈ [ϕ] then χ ∈ [ξ] by a similar argument. So
[ϕ] = [ξ] which contradicts the hypothesis. Thus, [ϕ] is the unique min-
imal element in Xϕ, i.e. Xϕ< = [ϕ].
Part 3: Let ′ be relation retrieved from (X,) by 〈 to 〉. Now we prove
=′. ϕ  ψ if and only if [ϕ] ∈ X, [ψ] ∈ X and [ϕ]  [ψ] due to
〈 to 〉, and if and only if Xϕ< exists, Xψ< exists and Xϕ<  Xψ< as we have
proved [ϕ] = X
ϕ
< when [ϕ] ∈ X, and if and only if ϕ ′ ψ since ′ is
constructed through〈 to 〉 from (X,). Thus, =′.
Proof (for Lemma 4.3). We only need to prove (i) Xϕ< exists if and only
if ϕ ∈ Ref(), and (ii) Xϕ< = [ϕ]. (i): Let Xϕ< exist. Since K = X< and
K  X for all X ∈ X, then X<  Xϕ<. So   ϕ due to 〈 to 〉 and hence
ϕ ∈ Ref(). On the other hand, let ϕ ∈ Ref(), then there exists ψ such
that ϕ  ψ or ψ  ϕ. In both cases it follows that there exists Xϕ< due to
〈 to 〉. Thus, Xϕ< exists if and only if ϕ ∈ Ref(). (ii): For any ψ, ψ ∈ Xϕ<
if and only if Xϕ< = X
ϕ∧ψ
< by observation 7.2, and if and only if ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ
due to 〈 to 〉, i.e. ψ ∈ [ϕ]. Thus, Xϕ< = [ϕ].
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Proof (for Theorem 4.4). The equivalence between propositions 1 and 2
follows from Lemmas 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. For the equivalence between propo-
sitions 1 and 3 (i.e. axiomatization of independent revision), see Zhang &
Hansson [16].
Proof (for Lemma 5.2). Firstly, we show that (Y,′) is a canonical sen-
tential model.
(Y1): It follows immediately that Y is a set of belief sets with Y ⊆ X and
that (X,) is a relational model.
(Y2): K is the unique -minimal element in X, so K ∈ Y by the
deﬁnition of Y.
(′ 1): K  X for all X ∈ Y ⊆ X. Moreover,  ∩(X × X) ⊆′ by the
deﬁnition of ′. Thus, K ′ X for all X ∈ Y.
(′ 2): Let Yϕ = ∅, then Xϕ = ∅ since Y ⊆ X and hence Xϕ< exists. Now we
prove that in this case, Xϕ< ∈ Yϕ and Xϕ< = Yϕ<′ . Assume for contradiction
that Xϕ< /∈ Yϕ. It follows that Xϕ< /∈ Y, i.e. there is D ⊆ X such that for
any Y ∈ D, Y < Xϕ< and Xϕ< ⊆
⋃
D. So there exists Y ∈ D ⊆ X such that
ϕ ∈ Y , i.e. Y ∈ Xϕ, and Y < Xϕ<. This shows that Xϕ< is not the unique
-minimal element in Xϕ. So Xϕ< ∈ Yϕ. Moreover, for any Y ∈ Yϕ ⊆ Xϕ,
X
ϕ
< ′ Y by the deﬁnition of ′. Suppose for contradiction that there exists
some Y = Xϕ< such that Y ∈ Yϕ and Y <′ Xϕ<. It follows from the deﬁnition
of ′ that there exists X = Xϕ< such that X ∈ Yϕ ⊆ Xϕ and Y ′ X < Xϕ<.
This shows that Xϕ< is not the unique -element in Xϕ. Thus, Yϕ<′ exists
and Yϕ<′ = X
ϕ
<.
(∗′1): Suppose for contradiction that there exists some X ∈ Y such that
there is no ϕ satisfying X = Yϕ<′ . This means that for any ϕ ∈ X, there
exists some Y ∈ Y ⊆ X such that ϕ ∈ Y and Y <′ X. Due to the deﬁnition
of ′, it follows that for any ϕ ∈ X, there exists some Y ∈ X such that
ϕ ∈ Y and Y < X. It follows from the deﬁnition of Y that X /∈ Y.
(′3): It follows immediately from the deﬁnition of ′ that it is transitive.
Moreover, (∗′1) yields that ′ is reﬂexive. Thus, ′ is a pre-order on Y.
Then, we prove that a revision operator is based on (X,) if and only if it is
based on (Y,′). Note that we have shown that when Xϕ< exists, Yϕ<′ exists
as well and Yϕ<′ = X
ϕ
<. Moreover, let Y
ϕ
<′ exist, then Y
ϕ
<′ ∈ Yϕ ⊆ Xϕ = ∅.




<′ as we have showed. Thus, by the deﬁn-
ition of 〈 to 〉, a revision operator is based on (X,) if and only if it is
based on (Y,′).
Proof (for Lemma 5.3). 1. Part 1: By Lemma 4.2, (X,) is a sentential
relational model. Now we check that it is also a canonical model.
(∗1): X ∈ X if and only if there exists some ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Ref() and
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X = [ϕ] due to 〈 to 〉, and if and only if X = [ϕ] = Xϕ< as we have
showed in proof of Lemma 4.2.
(3): Let X  Y and Y  Z, then there exist ϕ, ψ and ξ such that
X = [ϕ], Y = [ψ] and Z = [ξ]. So ϕ  ψ and ψ  ξ due to 〈 to 〉
and hence ϕ  ξ by the transitivity of . So, X  Z due to 〈 to 〉.
Moreover, for any ϕ ∈ Ref(), [ϕ]  [ϕ] due to 〈 to 〉 and the relative
counter-dominance of . Thus,  is a pre-order.
Part 2: Since  is a basic believability relation, it follows from Lemma 4.2
that  can be retrieved from (X,) by means of 〈 to 〉.
2. Part 1: Since Lemma 4.1 shows that  is a basic believability relation,
we only need to check that  satisﬁes transitivity: Let ϕ  ψ and ψ  ξ,






<  Xψ< and Xψ<  Xξ<. So Xϕ<  Xξ<
since (X,) is canonical model. Thus, ϕ  ξ due to 〈 to 〉.
Part 2: Let ′ be constructed from  by 〈 to 〉. Now we prove that
=′. X  Y if and only if X = Xϕ<  Xψ< = Y due to the deﬁnition of a
canonical model, and if and only if ϕ  ψ due to 〈 to 〉, and if and only
if [ϕ] ′ [ψ] due to〈 to 〉, and if and only if X ′ Y since Xϕ< = [ψ]
and Xψ< = [ψ] as we have proved. Thus, =′ and hence (X,) can be
reconstructed from  by means of 〈 to 〉.
Proof (for Theorem 5.4). It follows immediately from Lemmas 4.3, 5.2 and
5.3.
Proof (for Theorem 5.5). 1. From left to right: Since  satisﬁes exhaus-
tiveness we have ⊥ ∈ Ref(), and hence [⊥] ∈ X. Moreover, by the relative
counter-dominance of , ⊥  ⊥∧ϕ for every ϕ. Hence, [⊥] = Cn({⊥}) ∈ X.
For any ϕ, if Xϕ< exists, then X
ϕ
< = [ϕ] as we have shown. So for any ϕ,
X
ϕ
< = [ϕ]  [⊥] = Cn({⊥}) since ϕ  ⊥ due to the relative counter-
dominance of . If there exists ψ such that Cn({⊥})  Xψ<, then ⊥  ψ and
hence ξ  ψ for all ξ due to the relative counter-dominance and transitiv-
ity of . Then ψ ≡ ⊥ by maximality. Thus, for any ϕ ≡ ⊥, Xϕ< < Cn({⊥}).
From right to left: Suppose there exists some ϕ such that ψ  ϕ for all ψ and
ϕ ≡ ⊥. It follows that ⊥  ϕ and hence Cn({⊥}) = [⊥]  [ϕ] = Xϕ<. By
Observation 7.2, [⊥] = [ϕ] and hence ϕ ≡ ⊥ which contradicts the hypoth-
esis. Moreover, Cn({⊥}) ∈ X yields ⊥ ∈ Ref(). It follows that ϕ  ⊥ for
every ϕ due to relative counter-dominance of . Thus,  satisﬁes exhaus-
tiveness and maximality.
2. From left to right: Let Xϕ<  Xψ< and Xψ<  Xϕ<, then ϕ  ψ by 〈 to 〉.
So ϕ  ϕ∧ψ and ψ  ψ∧ϕ due to ϕ  ϕ, ψ  ψ and coupling of . Hence,
X
ϕ∧ψ
<  Xϕ< and Xϕ∧ψ<  Xψ< by 〈 to 〉. It follows from Observation 7.2




<. Thus,  is anti-symmetric. From right to left: Let
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ϕ  ψ and ϕ  ξ, then Xϕ< = Xψ< = Xξ< due to 〈 to 〉 and the anti-
symmetry of . So ψ ∈ Xξ< and hence Xϕ< = Xψ< = Xψ∧ξ< due to observation
7.2. Thus, by 〈 to 〉, ϕ  ψ ∧ ξ.
3. ϕ  ψ or ψ  φ holds if and only if Xϕ<  Xψ< or Xψ<  Xϕ< due to 〈 to 〉.
Note that (X,) is a canonical sentential model, i.e. for any X ∈ X, X = Xξ<
for some ξ. Thus,  satisﬁes completeness if and only if  does so.
Proof (for Theorem 5.6). It has been proved in Zhang & Hansson [16] that
revision operations based on sentential relational models satisfying (2) can
be characterized by the ﬁrst ﬁve postulates listed in the proposition. So by
Lemma 5.2, revision operations based on canonical sentential models satis-
fying that condition can also be represented by those postulates. Moreover,
Lemmas 4.3 and 5.3 and Theorem 5.5 jointly imply that a revision oper-
ation is based on this kind of canonical sentential model if and only if it
is based on a transitive believability relation satisfying exhaustiveness and
maximality. Thus, this theorem holds.
Proof (for Theorem 5.7). It has been proved in Zhang & Hansson [16] that
a revision operation is based on some strengthened sentential model if and
only if it satisﬁes closure, conﬁrmation, success, consistency and strong reci-
procity. Next we will prove that a revision operation is based on a strength-
ened sentential model if and only if it is based on a linear strengthened
sentential model.
Let (X,) be any strengthened sentential model. Let Y = X \ Cn({⊥}), as
we have shown in Theorem 5.5,  ∩(Y × Y) is a partial order. Given the
axiom of choice, there is a linear order ∗ on X which extends the partial
order .11 Let ′=∗ ∪{(X,Cn(⊥)) | X ∈ X}. Now we prove that (X,′) is
a linear strengthened sentential model. It is easy to see that (X,′) satisﬁes
(X1), (X2), (′2), (′ 1) and (′ 3) − (′ 5). For (′1) and (′ 2), we only
need to show that for every ϕ, if Xϕ = ∅, then Xϕ<′ = Xϕ<.
Let Xϕ = ∅, then Xϕ< exists and Xϕ< ′ X for every X ∈ Xϕ since (X,)
satisﬁes (2) and ′ extends . And for any Y ∈ Xϕ, if Y ′ Xϕ<, then





result also means that a revision operation  is based on (X,) if and only
if it is determined by (X,′).
Thus, by Lemmas 4.3, 5.3 and Theorem 5.5, the propositions 1 and 2 in this
theorem are equivalent.
11For more details on this result, see Jech [11]. And that ∗ extends  means that if
X  Y , then X ∗ Y .
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Proof (for Theorem 6.2). Conditions (1), (2), (	1) and (	2) are
just “translations” of inclusion, vacuity, superexpansion and subexpansion
through following rules:
1. ψ ∈ K  ϕ if and only if ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ
2. ϕ ∈ K if and only if   ϕ
3. ψ /∈ K  ϕ if and only if ϕ ≺ ϕ ∧ ψ
4. ϕ /∈ K if and only if  ≺ ϕ
Let  be a strengthened believability relation and  determined by this
relation. Then it is obvious that  and  satisfy the above four rules. It
immediately follows that the proposition 1 and the from left to right part of
the proposition 2 in this theorem hold.
For the from right to left part of the proposition 2, let  be a AGM revision
operation, then  can be determined by some strengthened believability
relation  as we have mentioned. So  and  also satisfy those translation
rules. Thus,  satisﬁes (	1) and (	2).
Proof (for Theorem 6.5). 1. We ﬁrst check that  is a standard entrench-
ment relations with respect to K.
Transitivity : Let ϕψ and ψξ, then ¬ϕ  ¬ψ and ¬ψ  ¬ξ due to 〈 to 〉.
So ¬ϕ  ¬ξ by the transitivity of . Thus, ϕξ due to〈 to 〉.
Dominance: Let ϕ 
 ψ, then ¬ψ 
 ¬ϕ and hence ¬ϕ  ¬ψ by the counter-
dominance of . Thus, ϕψ due to 〈 to 〉.
Conjunctiveness: By maxi-outcome of , ϕ ∧ ¬ψ  ϕ or ϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ. So, by
substituting ¬(ϕ∧ψ) for ϕ, (i) ¬(ϕ∧ψ)∧¬ψ  ¬(ϕ∧ψ) or (ii) ¬(ϕ∧ψ)∧ψ 
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) holds. Assume that (i) holds, since ¬ψ ≡ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ, then
¬ψ  ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) by the counter-dominance and transitivity of . Hence,
ψϕ∧ψ due to 〈 to 〉. Assume that (ii) holds, then since ¬(ϕ∧ψ)∧ψ 
 ¬ϕ,
¬ϕ  ¬(ϕ∧ψ) by counter-dominance and transitivity of . Hence, ϕϕ∧ψ
due to 〈 to 〉. Thus, ψϕ ∧ ψ or ϕϕ ∧ ψ.
∗-Minimality : ϕ /∈ K if and only if ¬ϕ ∈ K since K is a maximal consistent
belief set, and if and only if ¬ϕ  ψ for all ψ due to the minimality of ,
and if and only if ¬ϕ  ¬ψ for all ψ, and if and only if ϕψ for all ψ due to
〈 to 〉.
∗-Maximality : Let ψϕ for all ψ, then ¬ψ  ¬ϕ for all ψ due to 〈 to 〉.
It follows that ψ  ¬ϕ for all ψ. So ¬ϕ ≡ ⊥ by the maximality of . Thus,

 ϕ.
Then we show that  satisﬁes (): Let ϕ .= ψ, then ¬ϕ  ¬ψ due to 〈 to 〉.
Moreover, ¬ϕ  ¬ϕ by the counter-dominance for . So ¬ϕ  ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ by
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coupling for , and hence ¬ϕ  ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) by counter-dominance and tran-
sitivity for . Thus, ϕ .= ϕ ∨ ψ due to 〈 to 〉.
2. Part 1: we need to check that  satisﬁes the six conditions characterizing
maximal outcome believability relation. It is easy to see that transitivity,
coupling, counter-dominance, minimality and maximality are all satisﬁed.
We only give a detailed proof for maxi-outcome.
Maxi-outcome: By the conjunctiveness and dominance of , ϕ .= ϕ ∧ ψ
or ψ .= ϕ ∧ ψ. So, by substituting ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) for ϕ and ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) for ψ,
¬(ϕ∧ψ) .= ¬(ϕ∧ψ)∧¬(ϕ∧¬ψ) or ¬(ϕ∧¬ψ) .= ¬(ϕ∧ψ)∧¬(ϕ∧¬ψ) holds.
Since ¬(ϕ∧ψ)∧¬(ϕ∧¬ψ) ≡ ¬ϕ, ¬(ϕ∧ψ) .= ¬ϕ or ¬(ϕ∧¬ψ) .= ¬ϕ holds
by the dominance and transitivity of . Hence, ϕ  ϕ ∧ ψ or ϕ  ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
holds due to 〈 to 〉.
Part 2: ϕψ if and only if ¬¬ϕ¬¬ψ by dominance and transitive for ,
and if only if ¬ϕ  ¬ψ due to 〈 to 〉. Thus,  can be reconstructed from
 by 〈 to 〉.
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